A Discussion on Grid Resilience
A resilient power grid is essential as growing threats from extreme weather and cyberattacks increase the risk of widespread disruptions, making adaptation and reinforcement critical for the future.
The Critical Need for a Resilient Power Grid
The importance of a resilient grid cannot be overstated. Our dependence on electricity is so absolute that even a few hours without it feels unthinkable. Nearly every aspect of modern life runs on it, and as time goes on, more and more of our lives will be powered by it and it alone. A modern civilization, as we know it, cannot function without electricity. After just a few hours without power, life begins to resemble a pre-industrial world. The simple acts of preparing food, accessing clean water, staying cool in summer, or warm in winter—things we take for granted—become difficult, if not impossible.
The need for resilience has been highlighted before here and here. Climate change-driven extreme weather events are becoming more frequent. As our reliance on the grid grows, disruptions come with ever-increasing economic and social costs.
A resilient system doesn’t need to be foolproof or indestructible. The idea is rather to build a system that would have the ability to deal with extreme events gracefully.
What does that mean exactly? When an extreme event or a shock that has the ability to cause major disruption happens, the grid should have the ability to manage it in a way that minimizes impact on the user, for example by isolating the impacted region and stopping the outage from spreading. And where the limited outage does occur, the grid should have the ability to quickly recover from it.
Resilience also means continuous learning and improvement. This requires studying past disruptions in detail and preparing the grid today for the shocks of tomorrow. The system should be in a constant state of evolution.
Growing Threats to the Power Grid
The grid faces countless threats simply because it is one of the most exposed systems we rely on. Whether dealing with physical dangers or cyberattacks, it must constantly strengthen itself to remain dependable. The severity of these threats is also increasing. Extreme weather events, intensified by climate change, are becoming more frequent in certain regions. At the same time, cyber threats are expected to grow as we adopt smarter systems to monitor and manage the grid.
The vast majority of the grid has little to no physical protection. We pass by it every day without a second thought. A single pole driven to the ground can all but guarantee a local blackout. Local substations, too, remain largely unguarded against sabotage. Most of us instinctively avoid wires, poles, and electrical equipment—not just because of the danger symbols they don like epaulets on a general’s uniform, but because we don’t fully understand the risks and would rather keep our distance than gamble with electrocution.
Weather-related damage can easily bring down the grid. Climate change is already driving more frequent floods and drought-induced wildfires, a trend that is expected to worsen. Some regions will see extreme rainfall and flooding, while others will endure prolonged dry spells.
Traditionally, the grid has managed flooding by elevating critical equipment above expected flood water levels and using overhead wires, which are quicker to repair after an event. However, overhead wiring is highly vulnerable to high winds, especially those from hurricanes. As ocean temperatures rise, hurricanes are expected to grow more intense.
Wildfires are becoming an increasingly frequent threat to the grid, especially in western North America. California has recently seen wildfires raging dangerously close to downtown Los Angeles. Fires that damage key infrastructure—such as generation stations or critical transmission substations—can lead to prolonged blackouts.
Beyond physical threats, the digitization of grid infrastructure—from smart meters and controllers to a vast network of sensors—has increased the risk of cyberattacks. The growing reliance on software, and now AI, to manage grid operations supports the integration of distributed energy resources but also introduces new vulnerabilities.
Building a Resilient Grid for the Future
Natural and man-made shocks to the grid should be seen as inevitable.
Sabotage will always pose a risk, as there will always be those who seek to spread chaos and suffering. Natural threats like hurricanes cannot be prevented either; they will remain a seasonal reality for the foreseeable future. The grid must prepare for high precipitation, powerful winds, and frequent flooding.
The assumption should not be that some miracle of weather engineering will lessen these events. Instead, we must expect climate change to intensify and increase their frequency across many regions.
Wildfires should also be considered a major threat, though proactive forest management and mitigation efforts may become routine, making their impact on the grid more controllable than disasters like hurricanes or earthquakes.
Although most natural shocks to the grid cannot be controlled as wildfires might be, utilities can implement various strategies to mitigate their impact.
Hardening components—making everything as strong as possible—is the most straightforward way to reinforce the grid. This includes strengthening transmission towers to better withstand failure. Techniques like installing extra-tough dead-end structures at intervals help prevent a domino effect, where a single fallen tower pulls down its neighbors, potentially collapsing an entire line for kilometers.
Utilities are increasingly burying power lines to strengthen the grid. Overhead wires have become a rare sight in urban areas. However, the decision to underground wires must be carefully considered. In flood-prone regions, it may do more harm than good, as buried lines remain vulnerable to water damage. Undergrounding is also costly, and repairs are more complex. Yet in areas prone to ice storms or strong winds, it may be the ideal solution.
Strengthening the grid requires careful analysis. Making infrastructure stronger can also sometimes make it harder to repair or replace quickly. This tradeoff is evident in the decision between undergrounding wires and installing them overhead.
But resilience isn’t just about preventing failures—it’s also about enabling a swift recovery. A key aspect of resilience is ensuring that critical equipment, such as transformers, has sufficient spare reserves for rapid repairs and replacements after a disruption.
Another key feature to enable resilience is redundancy. Redundancy is a common element of design in complex machines and construction projects where failure is not an option. For example, airplanes have two engines but can still fly if one fails. Rockets incorporate redundancy in nearly every critical component, from engines and launch computers to sensors.
In the power grid, redundancy enhances reliability. This is especially true on the distribution side, particularly in urban areas where high network density makes redundancy more cost-effective to achieve. With multiple pathways available, disruptions can be isolated and sectioned-off while alternate routes continue carrying the load.
A key takeaway from this discussion should be that the threats to the grid are growing - as weather disruptions and cyber-attacks become more common - even as our reliance on it grows. This highlights the growing need for resilience in the future. A less resilient grid will create economic costs for businesses and individuals, while at the same time, it will create new opportunities for off-grid solutions such as microgrids to tackle this emerging problem.
Climate adaptation solutions like levees to fend off flood water and aggressive forest management to manage wildfire risk will also see growing interest in the future as weather disruptions become a more frequent phenomenon.
Bibliography
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation's Electricity System. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24836
