Nuclear Energy in the Battle for Global Influence
Nuclear energy is a tool of geopolitical power, binding nations through decades of technical and political dependence — a leverage Russia and China exploit.
The Geopolitical Logic of Nuclear Energy
What Makes Nuclear Different
Nuclear, unlike other energy technologies, demands a long-term, stable partnership between collaborators. Its complexity, combined with the profound need for trust, makes this relationship more than transactional — it becomes a shared custodianship, bound by the responsibility to prevent proliferation, accidents, or worse.
There is a security dimension that surrounds nuclear — a gravity, a sobering awareness, unlike any other energy source. It demands seriousness. For this reason, nuclear trade deals almost always take place between countries that are already close allies — or between nations willing to pledge themselves to that kind of enduring friendship. In this way, nuclear locks in loyalty more firmly than foreign aid, more deeply than fighter jets. It binds nations not just by interest, but by shared fate.
Nuclear energy belongs to a class of strategically vital industries — alongside weapons manufacturing and critical minerals — that China and Russia have increasingly woven into their national strategies. Through these industries, they cultivate long-term dependencies, using economic ties to extend their geopolitical reach.
What sets nuclear apart is its power to embed influence across generations. From constructing a reactor, to operating it for decades, to managing its fuel, its waste, and eventually its decommissioning — the lifecycle can stretch across a full century.
This is a stark contrast to most energy projects, where construction is followed by a relatively quick handoff to local utilities. Nuclear’s sheer technical complexity creates something far stronger: a lock-in not just of technology, but of trust, expertise, and political alignment.
How Russia and China Use Nuclear to Gain Influence
It is Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, that leads bids for nuclear plant projects in other countries. Each bid comes wrapped in the full weight of the Russian state’s political and financial backing. Rosatom doesn’t just build the plant — Rosatom engineers operate it. Rosatom supplies the fuel. Rosatom promises to retrieve and manage the waste when the reactor’s life is over. It is a one-stop shop, offering comprehensive nuclear support: planning, construction, operation, and fuel management, all under one roof. This full-service package is further sweetened with generous financing to cover both construction and long-term operation — funding that Western companies simply cannot match.
This subsidized approach, while offering a cheaper option for many countries, ultimately expands Russia’s influence over their energy systems — and often far beyond. The dependency stretches well past energy itself, embedding Russian influence into the country’s broader political and economic fabric, in ways far more enduring than conventional trade relationships. Such a bond gives Russia quiet leverage — the kind that can shape, or even steer, a country’s policy decisions for decades to come.
China is closely following Russia’s playbook. Already a nuclear heavyweight, China has surpassed France to become the world’s second-largest nuclear energy producer, with the most aggressive reactor construction plans of any nation.
In some areas, China’s expertise in building advanced reactors even rivals — or surpasses — that of the United States. Its state nuclear giant, CNNC, mirrors Rosatom’s strategy, bundling reactor projects with state financing and long-term operational partnerships.
China is building nuclear plants in Romania and Pakistan, while steadily expanding its footprint across Africa and Central Asia — financing not only nuclear facilities, but a sweeping array of infrastructure projects, all under the banner of its Belt and Road Initiative.
Today, nearly three-quarters of the nuclear reactors planned or under construction worldwide are being built by Russia and China. The challenge for the US companies, of course, is that Russian and Chinese companies are driven by far more than profit. With the full backing of their states, their motivation is securing influence, not just revenue. Western companies, by contrast, operate without that level of state support, leaving them unable to compete on economics alone. In the end, this imbalance weakens the United States, gradually pushing its influence aside in key regions around the world.
The Fukushima accident in 2011 was a blow to the West. In its aftermath, the entire nuclear industry slipped into stagnation. Planned projects across the globe were paused, reconsidered, or outright canceled. That hesitation gave Russia its opening. With Western companies retreating, Russia stepped in — and today, it holds the largest portfolio of overseas reactors. Russia is building — or has already built — reactors in Turkey, Egypt, India, and across Eastern Europe, steadily expanding its nuclear footprint.
Today, the challenge extends beyond reactor technology — it’s also about fuel. The West cannot even fully supply itself, leaving its nuclear sector still partially dependent on Russian fuel. With its weakened nuclear supply chain, the West is in no position to reliably fuel reactors for other countries either.
The West’s Nuclear Counterstrategy
After Russia invaded Ukraine, the West saw a sudden surge of political will to sever its dependencies on Russia. In the nuclear sector, this dependency centers largely around nuclear fuel. Key developments have followed.
Stockpiling
Anticipating disruptions to Russian supplies, some utilities began independently stockpiling fuel, aiming to keep their reactors running for the next 3 to 4 years. In fact, U.S. imports of Russian nuclear fuel rose in 2023 — exceeding levels from both 2022 and 2021 — as companies rushed to secure supply ahead of a planned 2024 ban. At the same time, the U.S. sharply increased imports from China in 2023, after nearly none since 2020.
A national nuclear fuel stockpile, modeled after the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, could provide a short-term buffer against geopolitical risk. But in the long run, weaning off both Russia and China, and rebuilding a supply chain anchored among trusted allies, may be the only way to shield the industry from future geopolitical shocks.
Sapporo5
In 2023, the U.S. and its allies — Canada, France, Japan, and the UK — came together to form the Sapporo5, a strategic partnership aimed at strengthening nuclear supply chain security and breaking free from Russian influence. Their primary focus has been securing fuel mining, conversion, and enrichment capacity — not just from Russia, but also from “other” foreign influences, a clear reference to China. At the heart of Sapporo5 is the nuclear fuel supply, where the challenge is stark: outside of Russia and China, global enrichment capacity can only meet about 70% of the world’s existing reactor demand.
Banning Russia
In response to Russia’s invasion and the U.S. decision to ban Russian uranium fuel imports, several Western companies — including Cameco, Urenco, and Orano — have announced plans to expand their existing conversion and enrichment capacity. The goal is clear: to eventually eliminate dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel altogether.
The goal of the ban is to force domestic utilities to shift their nuclear fuel contracts to U.S. and European suppliers. By cutting off Russian fuel, the ban creates demand and incentivizes suppliers to expand production and invest in new enrichment capacity. Right now, U.S. enrichment capabilities are severely limited — the country relies on foreign providers for more than 75% of its enrichment services. Russia, by comparison, holds over five times the enrichment capacity of the United States.
Defence of Eastern Europe
Several Eastern European countries remain heavily dependent on Russian-fabricated uranium fuel rods, a legacy of the Soviet-era reactors still in operation. Across Europe and Ukraine, there are more than 30 Russian-built reactors still running today. Among them, Ukraine stands out as the most dependent. Situated on Russia’s doorstep, and having already endured the costs of relying too heavily on Russian gas since 2022, these countries are now eager to achieve full energy independence.
Over the past two years, companies like Urenco and Orano have expanded their fuel supply capabilities, working to reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian uranium fuel.
Ukraine has more reason than most to cut itself free from Russian influence. For decades, its nuclear sector was entirely dependent on Russia — from fuel supply to reactor technology. That is now beginning to change. Cameco, the Canadian uranium giant, recently signed a 10-year agreement to supply uranium hexafluoride for Ukraine’s reactors. Meanwhile, Westinghouse has stepped in to fabricate fuel rods compatible with Russian-built reactors. Together, these moves could finally liberate Ukraine’s nuclear industry from Russian control, creating a crucial pillar of its broader push for energy independence.
Countering Russia and China elsewhere
Ukraine’s dependence on Russia, significant as it was, pales in comparison to what new customers of Rosatom or China’s CNNC will face in the future. Ukrainian reactors were operated by Ukrainian engineers, not Rosatom staff. Ukraine relied on Russia mainly for fuel and replacement parts — a difficult dependency to break, but not insurmountable.
For countries now signing deals with Russia and China, the entanglement runs far deeper. When Rosatom or CNNC controls everything — from reactor construction to operations, and in some cases even owning the plants themselves — severing ties becomes vastly more complicated.
So far, the U.S. has shown reluctance to follow the path taken by Russia and China, offering generous financing to secure nuclear energy deals abroad. Instead, the U.S. has focused on promoting SMRs to its allies in Asia — a strategy that leans more on technology than financing.
But matching the sheer aggressiveness of Rosatom and CNNC, with their state-guaranteed loans, is a far greater challenge for the U.S., where nuclear remains a largely private-sector industry, with only minimal government backing — even at home.
Today, the cost of nuclear remains out of reach for many developing nations, driving their reliance on foreign financial support. That landscape, however, is shifting. In the U.S., rising interest from Big Tech — particularly to power AI data centers — is accelerating new momentum for nuclear development. In time, if cost-effective SMRs emerge that can outcompete on both technology and price, they could become the U.S.’s answer, allowing nuclear exports to ride the wave of AI-driven demand.
What This Means
A growing divergence is becoming clearer by the year — with two spheres of influence emerging: the U.S. and its allies on one side, Russia and China on the other. For the nuclear industry, however, this fractured world holds unexpected opportunities.
With foreign fuel suppliers like Russia pushed out, domestic companies involved in uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment find themselves facing new opportunities. For companies in nuclear energy, this is a rare chance to strengthen their competitive moat.
Producing fuel for nuclear reactors is no simple task. The scientific hurdles are steep. The operational demands are unforgiving. Handling nuclear fuel requires safety credentials and proven experience — trust that new entrants struggle to earn.
By banning Russia, the few companies capable of filling that void have the chance to expand both their offerings and their expertise.
There is also an opportunity for the U.S. government to step in with funding assistance for international nuclear projects — a move that companies can lobby for, but ultimately one that lies beyond their direct control. If such support materializes, it would open new markets and also expand the pool of potential customers for U.S. nuclear firms. A strong domestic nuclear industry also gives the US government a lever to create geopolitical influence.
There are several challenges that face companies in the nuclear industry. Capital investment in nuclear typically requires large scale, with returns spread over decades, meaning risk must be carefully understood before any commitment.
The central concern is clear: if a peace treaty with Russia is signed in the future, could Russian uranium return to the American market? Without a clear, binding signal from the U.S. government that this risk has been eliminated, investors will hesitate — unwilling to gamble billions on an uncertain future.
U.S. nuclear capacity could more than double by 2050, meaning demand for uranium fuel will climb sharply over the next 25 years. Achieving this while preserving energy independence will be no small feat. For an industry that, until recently, hadn’t seriously planned for even a single new reactor, and had only built enough capacity to serve existing plants, this is an ambitious — almost radical — shift.
The challenge grows steeper with Russian fuel off the table. The U.S. nuclear supply chain, which today operates at a fraction of its 1990s strength, is essentially starting from scratch. Rebuilding that capacity — and scaling it to meet a doubling of reactors — will be extraordinarily difficult, almost impossible without deep cooperation from European and Japanese partners.